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Abstract 
The clandestine involvement of military folk in the political and industrial affairs of the nation has a long 
history. Dissenting organisations should adopt counter-intelligence measures 'Oppositional, dissident 
organisations owe it to themselves and their supporters to adopt counter-intelligence procedures.' 
Photograph: Guardian Australia Allegations this week that the anti-mining camp at Maules creek in NSW 
was infiltrated by corporate spies should come as no surprise. While one activist told the Guardian 
Australia she felt "a sickening feeling of betrayal", in reality this is the Australian way. The clandestine 
involvement of military folk in the political and industrial affairs of the nation, done with staggering 
panache and ruthlessness, has a long history. 
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Rowan Cahill 
The clandestine involvement of military folk in the political and industrial affairs of the nation 
has a long history. Dissenting organisations should adopt counter-intelligence 
measuresoppositional, dissident organisations owe it to themselves and their supporters to 
adopt counter-intelligence procedures.'  
Allegations this week that the anti-mining camp at Maules creek in NSW was infiltrated by 
corporate spies should come as no surprise. While one activist told the Guardian Australia 
she felt "a sickening feeling of betrayal", in reality this is the Australian way. The clandestine 
involvement of military folk in the political and industrial affairs of the nation, done with 
staggering panache and ruthlessness, has a long history.  
During the 1920s and 1930s, private quasi-military outfits proliferated in Australia, drawing to 
a great extent on the vast pool of ex-soldiery that was the legacy of the first world war. 
Bearing names like the order of silent knights, the blackshirts, the white guard, the new 
guard, and the league of national security, these groups had an estimated overall 
membership of 130,000. The male population at the time was around 2 million. 
Disciplined, well organised and conspiratorial, these outfits were distrustful of democratic 
processes and hostile towards organised labour. With access to arms and ammunition, and 
often with significant links to high-ranking military personnel, they waited in the wings for the 
circumstances that would give them the opportunity to mobilise against industrial militancy, 
which was seen as Bolshevik and the prelude to working class revolution. 
After the second world war, the tradition continued. The Communist party was a strong 
political and industrial presence, and unrest was increasing. The nation was governed by the 
Chifley Labor government, the nationalisation of the banking system was a possibility, and 
socialism was in the air.  
In response, an outfit called the association formed in 1947. Headed by senior military 
personnel from the second world war – including Sir Thomas Blamey, major-general CH 
Simpson, and general Sir Leslie Morshead – the association was well financed and drew 
support from ex-servicemen. It only disbanded once the nation was in "safe hands" after the 
election of the conservative Menzies government in 1950, when the leadership of the 
Australian security intelligence organisation passed to former military intelligence personnel. 
Half a century later, Patrick Stevedores and the maritime union of Australia were engaged in 
a major dispute. When employer interests sought a non-union workforce to replace unionists 
on the waterfront, they turned in 1997 to ex-military personnel. The initial recruitment drive 
was run in the official Army newspaper. 
And so to today, and another time with a supply of ex-service personnel, courtesy of our 
involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some have subsequent experience as 
mercenaries in the lucrative subcontractor world of private security in the same zones of 
conflict. Add to these former Australian federal police personnel, experienced abroad in 
Australian "peace keeping" missions.  
It is to be expected that civilian community organisations that oppose and threaten the 
smooth rollout of corporate plans will be targeted by spooks of either the official or private 
kind. It doesn't matter their stripe: anti-coal mining outfits, anti-coal seam gas outfits, anti-
logging organisations, conservation organisations of any kind, NGOs that end up contesting 
government policies – indeed, any organisation that has the potential to mobilise political 
dissent – should expect to be infiltrated. Indeed, it became known in 2012 that conservation 
groups were already under surveillance by ASIO. 
Oppositional, dissident organisations owe it to themselves and their supporters to adopt 
counter-intelligence procedures and processes. This has been done before. During its 
lifetime, the communist party of Australia ran its own operation. While abundant official and 
party archival materials highlight its failures to defend itself from spook penetration and 
surveillance, so too are there manifold examples of its successes, including its own 
penetration of Australian security and police services. It's not rocket science; simply a 
judicious mix of common sense, care, discretion – and perhaps a touch of suspicion.  
 
